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Abstract
We model the main arguments of the net neutrality debate in a
two-sided market framework with network congestion sensitive con-
tent providers and Internet consumers on each side, respectively. The
platform is controlled by a monopolistic Internet service provider, who
may choose to sell content providers prioritized access to its customers.
We explicitly consider the adverse effects of traffic prioritization to the
remaining best-effort class and find that network discrimination has
overall positive effects on welfare, because congestion is better allocated
to those content providers with congestion inelastic advertisement rev-
enues. In the long-run, network discrimination leads to infrastructure
investments in transmission capacity and encourages innovation on
the content provider side. In the short-run, however, discrimination
has no effect on innovation because the ISP expropriates the content
providers’ increased surplus through the price for priority access. This
is the downside of network discrimination: Albeit total welfare is in-
creased, content providers will–at least in the short-run–be worse off
than under network neutrality. Although price regulation can shift
some of the congestion alleviation gains back to content providers, it
is inapt as a policy instrument, because welfare is proportionally de-
stroyed in the process.
1 Introduction
Without doubt, the Internet has become the central means of communica-
tions in almost all parts of the world and is virtually ubiquitously available,
even in very remote areas. The Internet’s popularity is in large due to the
sheer endless number of available applications and services. The Internet
not only accommodates all classical means of communications, such as tele-
phony and video, but also an increasing number of new innovative services.
The growing importance of the Internet is tightly intertwined with the in-
novations it has put forth. These innovations include new communications
technology (e.g. instant messaging or video-on-demand), new business mod-
els (e.g. online retailing) and new forms of social interaction (e.g. social
networking).
It has been frequently argued1 that these innovations could only have
emerged because the Internet provides an open, standardized and above all
non-discriminatory platform. More precisely, the so-called end-to-end prin-
ciple has always been a major design principle of the Internet. It postulates
that all “intelligence” (e.g. new protocols) should be located at the edges of
1In particular by consumer rights groups, such as savetheinternet.com or
openinternetcoalition.com, and large content providers, such as Google, Yahoo and
eBay (cf. e.g. Google, 2009), but also by academics (e.g. Crawford, 2007).
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the network (i.e. the sending and receiving end), while the backbone network
shall be kept dedicated to simply relaying data on a non-discriminatory basis
via the Internet protocol (IP). In particular, the end-to-end principle allows
for innovations at the edge of the network without requiring prior “consent”
of any party controlling the backbone network.
In 2006 larger US broadband service providers like AT&T, Comcast or
Verizon finally realized that the content business had become a large prof-
itable market with growing demand for sophisticated online services. Afraid
of becoming a mere bit pipe and well aware of the fact that content providers
already pay for the data transportation in general, they had the idea to
charge certain content providers an additional fee for prioritized delivery of
data packets to the connected users. They claim that the continuously in-
creasing traffic due to high bandwidth services (cf. e.g. Swanson and Gilder,
2008) forces them to invest in costly infrastructure and the service owners
should at least take a share at these costs.
With this sword of Damocles in mind, the most radical proponents of
network neutrality oppose violations of the end-to-end principle which may
result in any sort of discrimination of data packets based on their origin,
destination or content type (cf. e.g. Crowcroft, 2007). Discrimination of
whatever sort is seen as a threat to the innovational spirit of the Internet,
because it would preclude a level playing field for providers of new innovative
services (e.g. Sydell, 2007). There is a deep-grounded fear that innovation and
investment incentives of Internet start-ups would be negatively distorted or
even completely destroyed because well-established content providers could
buy themselves a preferred treatment of their data and thereby foreclose
entry of new firms. Under this view, it is argued that some of the currently
successful services, such as video portals or voice-over-IP, would not have
been possible if the respective data packets were put at a disadvantage to
traffic from established content.
On the contrary, opponents of net neutrality comment that discrimina-
tion is a necessary means in order to be able to cope with the increasing
infrastructure requirements of new innovative services, e.g. with respect to
bandwidth and latency. Hence, discrimination has a positive annotation and
might even be welfare enhancing, because it explicitly enables entry of those
content providers who crucially hinge on bandwidth and latency require-
ments which the traditional neutral best-effort Internet cannot provide (in
the future). Consequently, from a technological point of view, net neutral-
ity might even hinder innovation, because innovations can only occur if the
corresponding business models are sustainable under the best-effort domain.
Of course the arguments are much more multi-layered than can be de-
scribed here. Many recent publications, especially from the law domain, have
attempted to cover the relevant facets of the net neutrality debate. More for-
mal analyses of the issue are rare, however. We attempt to isolate the formal
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arguments in order to shed some light on the effect of network discrimination
on innovation and welfare.
The majority of Internet users pays a monthly fee, either as a flatrate
subscription or based on time or volume, for accessing content and services
on the Internet. Certainly, for each user the value of his Internet connection
increases with the availability of more content providers. However, generally
users are fairly reluctant to pay additionally for specific content or services
(Dou, 2004). The notion of a free-for-all Internet is still manifested deep
in the minds of many and roots in the not-for-profit history of the early
academically oriented Internet. Thus, for the most part content providers
rely on online advertisement in order to generate revenues from their service
offerings. Consequently, content providers value the presence of Internet
users, because they will generate revenues through clicks on advertisements.
More formally, we capture this scenario by considering Internet users and
content providers to be on either side of a two-sided market: The presence
of users on one side of the market generates positive network externalities
for content providers on the other side, and vice versa. Both sides are con-
nected through an Internet service provider (ISP) who “controls” the market
in the sense that he sets the terms of access for users and content providers
strategically. Users are always charged a flatrate for accessing the Internet.
Under a neutral network regime, with a single best-effort data transmission
service, the ISP does not charge the content provider in the market. Under
a discriminatory regime, the ISP offers the content providers the additional
option to buy priority access to the Internet for an extra charge. The content
providers who exercise this option will be provided with a priority transmis-
sion service which enqueues request to their websites ahead of those request
to websites of content providers in the best-effort class.
We investigate the effects of such discriminatory practice in the short-run
and in the long-run. In the short-run, when the ISP’s transmission capacity
is fixed, network discrimination has at least two different effects.
On the one hand, speeding up some traffic will unmistakably lead to a re-
duction of average transmission speed in the best-effort class. Thus, those
content providers who are not willing to pay for priority access are put at a
disadvantage twice: First, from the speeding up of other providers’ content
and second from the slowing down of their own content. This disadvantage
lies at the heart of the concern of network neutrality proponents.2
2In this paper we abstract from any form of direct service discrimination. Examples
for such anti-competitive behavior would be the actual case of mobile phone operators
blocking VoIP transmissions in their wireless networks (Hahn et al., 2007) or the degra-
dation of traffic flows of certain protocols, such as P2P, in backbones of large Internet
service providers. In our model every service provider can buy priority access on the
same conditions and discrimination does not correspond to exclusion of services based
on anticompetitive behavior. However, it shall be annotated that presently no generally
accepted definition of net neutrality exists. For example, at the other extreme end, some
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On the other hand, the business model of some content providers will be
more sensitive to transmission quality3 than that of other providers. For
example, a content provider who offers an on-demand video streaming ser-
vice is certainly more sensitive to network congestion than a simple e-mail
service provider. Consequently, when a content provider’s service cannot be
reliably offered such that the users’ experience is unsatisfactory, online ad-
vertisement revenues will decline, possibly up to the point where the content
provider is forced out of business. This argument is therefore in favor of net-
work discrimination, because it would actually allow for entry of innovative,
transmission quality demanding services.
Under some further assumptions, we formally investigate which one of the
two arguments has more impact under a discriminatory network regime. Our
main finding is that in the long-run network discrimination will lead to more
innovation. Furthermore, we compare the overall welfare effects of discrimi-
natory practice with respect to a network neutral regime and find that net-
work discrimination is generally welfare enhancing. This is because conges-
tion is better allocated to the congestion insensitive content providers, while
providing some congestion relief to the content providers with congestion sen-
sitive business models. However, in the short-run all content providers are
worse off under network discrimination because this efficiency gain is fully
appropriated by the ISP through the welfare neutral priority charge.
Finally, we explicitly compare the ISP’s long-run incentive to invest into
infrastructure (i.e. transmission capacity) under both network regimes. On
the one hand, it can be argued that a network neutral regime provides the
best incentives for network investment, because ISPs can only charge users
higher prices for access if there is a wide variety of content available. Content
providers, on the contrary, will only be available if the best-effort transmis-
sion capacity is sufficient for their business models. Indeed, currently ISPs
generally engage in costly overprovisioning of transmission capacity in or-
der to accommodate for the most transmission-quality-demanding content
providers in peak times. On the other hand, it seems logical that ISPs have
an increased incentive to upgrade their infrastructure under a discriminatory
net neutrality proponents regard only anti-competitive discrimination of specific services
as a violation of net neutrality. In this line, Tim Berners-Lee, founder and director of the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) argues:“If I pay to connect to the Net with a certain
quality of service, and you pay to connect with that or greater quality of service, then we
can communicate at that level.” (Berners-Lee, 2006). In our view, which is in line with the
more formal literature, such practice would clearly violate net neutrality. Instead we fol-
low the definition of Hahn and Wallsten (2006) who point out that net neutrality “usually
means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access,
do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for
sending information over broadband lines to end users.”
3For expositional simplicity, in the following we will often use “speed” or “congestion”
as a proxy for different transmission quality measures, such as bandwidth, latency or jitter.
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regime, because then they can make the most demanding content providers
pay for it.4 Again, there are arguments in favor of either regime and the
overall effect is unclear ex-ante. Our formal analysis reveals that ISPs have
a stronger incentive to invest into network infrastructure under a discrimi-
natory regime.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
compare our model assumptions and results to related work. In Section 3
the formal model is laid out and in Section 4 the short-term effects of net-
work discrimination are considered. In Section 5 we investigate the long-term
effects of a discriminatory regime with respect to infrastructure investment
incentives. We conclude in Section 6 by summarizing our results and provid-
ing some policy advice.
2 Related Work
With only few notable exceptions, the net neutrality debate has thus far been
characterized by rather qualitative and rhetorical publications, mostly com-
ing from the law domain (e.g. Faulhaber and Rasmussen, 2006; Yoo, 2005;
Wu, 2003). Within the more formal strand of the literature, Choi and Kim
(2008) (and Cheng et al., 2009) take an interesting approach by embodying
standard results from queuing theory, which allows them to precisely model
the relationship between priority and best-effort traffic. In our model, we will
follow the same approach. However, the focus of Choi and Kim differs from
ours. The authors investigate the effect of network discrimination among two
competing content providers in a standard Hotelling model. It is assumed
that customers dislike congestion and visit one of the two content providers
exclusively. In reverse, the content providers can improve their competitive
position by purchasing priority access from a monopolistic ISP. The hitch is,
that the ISP will sell priority access only to one of the two content providers.
The authors have to make this unconventional assumption, because other-
wise the content providers engage in a prisoners’ dilemma such that both end
up purchasing the priority access: Clearly, individually each content provider
prefers the priority access if the other remains in the best-effort class. But if
both exercise this option neither gains an advantage and the price paid for
priority access is forfeited.
Furthermore, in order to resolve the coordination problem which of the two
content providers is awarded the priority access, Choi and Kim assume cost
asymmetry between the two competitors, such that only the “low cost”
provider can win the bargaining process with the ISP. The authors find
4Even if transmission capacity is not extended, a discriminatory network regime might
still be welfare enhancing because it avoids some of the the wasteful overprovisioning by
alleviating congestion for the most demanding content providers when needed.
5
that the content provider with the priority access obtains a larger market
share and consumers have to pay a lower access fee under the discriminatory
regime. In the short-run the overall effect of discrimination on welfare is am-
biguous. On the one hand, consumers pay less for network access, but on the
other hand, overall Hotelling transportation costs are higher. In the long-run,
the ISP’s investment incentives are held in check by two competing effects,
which the authors call “rent extraction” and “network access fee” effect. The
rent extraction effect provides the ISP with incentives to keep capacity scarce
because this allows him to extract more of the content providers’ rent. On
the contrary, by the network access fee effect the ISP would like to extend
capacity, such that he can charge consumers more for network access.
Economides and Tag (2008) analyze the effect of priority access in a net-
work discriminatory regime by considering a two-sided market model, very
much like ours. On one side of the market, there is a continuum of non-rivalry
content providers and, on the other side of the market, there is a continuum
of consumers. Each side experiences positive network externalities through
the presence of the other side. However, the authors do not consider a dis-
criminatory regime in the sense that some content providers are prioritized
over others. In their model, abandoning neutrality means that the platform
owner charges a lump-sum fee for access to his network. They find that for
a wide range of parameter values the incentives of the platform owner and
a social planner are not aligned. Charging content providers for access leads
to reduced market entry and consequently less externality to the consumer
side. This, in turn, leads to a lower access charge, such that more consumers
enter the market. The authors find that total welfare is higher under network
neutrality. This finding carries over to an extension with two ISPs, which
makes them conclude that their results are robust under a certain level of
competition.
Finally, Hermalin and Katz (2007) model network neutrality in a two-
sided market as product line restrictions to the quality decision problem of
the ISP. In contrast to our results they find that net neutrality regulation
can drive out content providers from the market. Content providers who
purchased a low-quality variant from the ISP will be excluded if there is only
one single quality available. In their model, the overall welfare implications
of neutrality regulation are very often negative. However, the authors do not
check for investment incentives of the ISP and therefore the model is static
in its nature.
Our model complements previous work in this strand of the literature
by explicitly considering the adverse effects of traffic prioritization to the
remaining best-effort class in a two-sided market model. Thereby, our focus is
to study the effect of network discrimination on innovation and infrastructure
investments.
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3 The Model
We model the Internet as a two-sided market, with content providers (CP)
on one side and Internet consumers (IC) on the other side, each of which
value an increasing presence of the other side and dislike network congestion.
In order to be able to isolate the arguments of the net neutrality debate
we abstract from the full complexity of networks forming the Internet and
consider a single monopolistic Internet service provider (ISP) providing access
to consumers and content providers, respectively.
Internet service provider: The ISP controls the two-sided market
through a number of variables which he sets strategically. First, he charges
an access fee, a, from connected consumers. Under a network neutral regime,
the consumer access fee is the only source of revenue for the ISP. As will be
described below, both consumers and content providers dislike network con-
gestion. The level of network congestion is captured by consumers’ average
waiting time for content, w, which is again controlled by the ISP through
his choice of transmission capacity, µ. The ISP therefore faces the following
basic tradeoff: On the one hand, he has an interest to reduce congestion,
because this draws more content providers and consumers onto the platform,
which in turn increases revenues from access. On the other hand, an increase
of the participants on either side of the market will ceteris paribus increase
congestion, which can only be counteracted by a costly increase of trans-
mission capacity. Therefore, under a neutral network regime, ISP’s long-run
profit is5
ΠNl = α¯a− k(µ), (1)
where α¯ and k(µ) denote the share of consumers subscribing in equilibrium
and the costs of capacity expansion, respectively.6 Under a discriminatory
network regime, the ISP has an additional source of revenue, which stems
from selling priority access (i.e. access with lower congestion) for a price of
p to those content providers requiring it. More precisely,
ΠDl = α¯[a+ λβθ¯p]− k(µ), (2)
where λ is the average number of content requests by the consumer side per
service provider, β is the share of content providers buying priority access
and θ¯ denotes the total mass of active content providers.
5Throughout this paper, the network neutral regime is indicated by the superscript N ,
whereas superscript D denotes the network discriminatory regime. Moreover, subscript s
and l denote short-run and long-run incentives, respectively.
6To ensure the existence of an interior solution to the ISP’s investment decision, we
assume a non-concave cost function, i.e. ∂k∂µ ≥ 0 and ∂
2k
∂µ2 ≥ 0
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In the short-run, the ISP’s previous investment decisions into transmis-
sion capacity are sunk, so that µ can be considered an exogenous variable
which is irrelevant for profit maximization. Thus, short-run ISP profits are
ΠNs = α¯a (3)
ΠDs = α¯[a+ λβθ¯p]. (4)
Content Providers: Whatever service content providers offer, they pro-
vide it for free and receive revenues only indirectly through online adver-
tisements.7 In the model, a content provider’s advertisement revenue will
depend on the average received traffic, the per-click advertisement revenue,
and the content provider’s individual click-through-rate which is determined
by its innate sensitivity towards network congestion. Regarding the received
traffic, we make two fundamental assumptions for simplification of the anal-
ysis:8
• Each content provider receives the same average traffic from the user
side, namely λα¯. This is independent of a content provider’s business
model and consequently its innate sensitivity to network congestion.
• Each content provider’s service is unique and therefore content
providers are not in direct competition for traffic. Each content
provider receives traffic of λα¯ from the user side, independent of the
number of other content providers currently in the market.
Nevertheless only a fraction of this traffic can be turned into advertise-
ment revenue. In online advertisement this measure is known as the click-
through-rate. We assume that each content provider’s click-through-rate di-
minishes as network congestion increases. Moreover, as argued before, each
content provider’s business model has an innate sensitivity to which extend
network congestion affects the click-through-rate. This individual congestion
sensitivity is denoted by θ and uniformly distributed on the unit interval. In
summary, the advertisement relevant portion of the gross network traffic that
arrives at content provider i is
(1− θiwI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability that
an arrival becomes
advertisement relevant
λα¯︸︷︷︸
Average of
arriving clicks per
content provider
(5)
where w denotes the average level of network congestion when requesting
the content provider’s service from the monopolistic ISP and I captures
7In particular, this means that we rule out the possibility of content providers charging
consumers directly for access to their content.
8We will comment on the model’s sensitivity to these assumptions in Section 6.
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consumers’ general impatience.9 Formula (5) can be interpreted as the ac-
tual click-through-rate on advertisements. In this vein, consider r to be the
revenue-per-click on advertisements. Then each content provider’s profit un-
der net neutrality is
UNCP (θi) =
{
(1− θiwNI)λα¯r if active
0 if inactive.
(6)
Notice, that a content provider’s profit will also depend on the overall
level of network congestion. In a discriminatory regime, differences in profit
will therefore depend on the change of congestion level and, if applicable, on
the additional price paid for priority treatment. Content providers’ profits
in the discriminatory regime are
UDCP (θi) =

(1− θiwD1 I)λα¯r − λα¯p if active with priority service
(1− θiwD2 I)λα¯r if active with best-effort service
0 if inactive.
(7)
As will be seen in detail later, it holds that wD1 < w
N < wD2 . Under a dis-
criminatory regime, the content provider who is indifferent between choosing
the priority and the best-effort transmission service is denoted by θ˜D. Fur-
thermore, in both regimes, the content provider who is indifferent between
becoming active and staying out of the market is characterized by a conges-
tion sensitivity of θ¯. Recall that θ is normalized to the unit interval, such
that θ¯ also reflects the mass of all active content providers. Thus, the share
of content providers choosing priority service under a discriminatory regime
is given by
β ≡ 1− θ˜
D
θ¯D
, (8)
for which obviously 0 < β < 1 must hold. Finally, see that the share of
consumers connected in equilibrium, α¯∗, generates positive externalities on
the content providers’ profit.
9Note that the probability that an user of a service becomes advertisement relevant to
the service provider follows a Poisson thinning process. The thinning probability depends
on the average waiting time (w) as a proxy for congestion in a transmission class and the
sensitivity of the service (θ) itself as well as the general impatience (I) of the consumers.
Therefore a service with a high innate sensitivity has a lower probability to make money
with the connected users than a service provider with a low innate sensitivity under a
given transmission quality and impatience.
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Network Congestion: Network congestion is measured through the con-
sumers’ average waiting time following a content request. In particular, like
Cheng et al. (2009) and Choi and Kim (2008), we employ a M/M/1 queuing
model to fix ideas on the relationship between average waiting time, net-
work traffic and capacity.10 Under a network neutral regime, i.e if all packets
are treated equally independent of origin or destination, the M/M/1 model
predicts that each consumer has an expected average waiting time of
wN =
1
µ− λT . (9)
Therein µ represents the average rate at which service requests are handled,
which is interpreted as the overall transmission capacity here; whereas λT
denotes the average rate at which consumers’ aggregate content requests
arrive at the ISP’s network, which is interpreted as network traffic:
λT = α¯θ¯λ,
i.e. network traffic will depend on the share of connected consumers, α¯, the
mass of available content providers, θ¯, and λ, which denotes the average
traffic of each user per content provider.11 As explained before, we thereby
make two important assumptions concerning the generation of traffic on the
consumers side. First, each consumer generates more traffic as the number
of content providers increases. Second, traffic generation grows linearly with
the number of content providers.
Under a discriminatory regime, content providers are offered the choice
between a priority and a best-effort transmission service. In the M/M/1
model this translates to introducing an additional queue which handles the
request of the content providers in the priority class and which is processed
ahead of the queue for the best-effort class. In this vein, the classical results of
the M/M/1 queuing model represent the average waiting time in the priority
class, wD1 , and the best-effort class, w
D
2 :
12
wD1 =
1
µ− βλT (10)
10The M/M/1 queuing model assumes that (i) service requests arrive according to a
Poisson process (i.e. arrivals happen continuously and independently of one another), (ii)
service time is exponentially distributed (i.e. request coming from a Poisson process are
handled at a constant average rate) and (iii) that service requests are processed by a single
server. Furthermore it is assumed that the length of the queue as well as the number of
users is potentially infinite. This model is standard and considered to be a good proxy for
actual Internet congestion.
11More precisely, λT =
∫ α¯
y=0
∫ θ¯
x=0
λ dx dy = α¯θ¯λ. As will be seen later, the consumer
side will always be covered in equilibrium due to its homogeneity, i.e. α¯ = 1 and thus
gross traffic will be λT = θ¯λ.
12Remember that service providers are equally frequented by consumers and therefore
the proportion of providers buying priority access is determined by the waiting time in
the two service classes.
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wD2 =
µ
µ− λT w
D
1 (11)
It is easy to see that relation
wD1 < w
N < wD2 (12)
is always fulfilled, assuming a fixed capacity µ and β < 1.13 This is an
important feature of our model, because it shows formally that serving some
content providers with priority will (in the short-run) unambiguously lead to
a degradation of service quality for the remaining content providers in the
best-effort class. These content providers are therefore put at a disadvantage
twice. First, through the prioritization of foreign traffic and second, through
the degradation of own traffic, compared to the network neutral regime.
Moreover, notice that the consumers’ average waiting time is independent
of the introduction of service classes,14 because each consumer will visit every
available content provider equally. Consumer requests to content providers
in the priority class will be processed within a time of wD1 , whereas request to
content providers in the best-effort class take wD2 units of time. Consequently,
average consumer waiting time is
wˆ = βwD1 + (1− β)wD2 = wD1
(
µ− βλT
µ− λT
)
= wN , (13)
since wD1 =
1
µ−βλT .
Consumers: Consumers are homogeneous and value basic connectedness
to the Internet as well as the presence of content providers. In particular,
we assume that connectedness adds a lump-sum utility of h whereas each
additional content provider adds a marginal utility of v to a consumer’s util-
ity.15 On the contrary, consumers dislike waiting for content due to network
congestion. This is captured through consumers’ average waiting time, wˆ.
To summarize, a consumer’s utility is given by
UIC =
{
h+ vθ¯ − c(I)wˆ − tα− a if connected
0 if not connected,
(14)
where c(I) denotes consumer’s marginal opportunity costs in time depending
on the level of impatience I, and a the access fee charged by the ISP.
13For β = 1, when all content providers are in the first priority class, the model trivially
collapses to wD1 = w
N
14And independent of β for that matter.
15Recall that content providers are atomistic and consumers have no preference for
specific content. Thereby we avoid to make any judgement about the value of a specific
service innovation to consumers and assume that consumers whose rate of request per
content provider is λ derive a utility of v from every content provider entering the market.
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Now assume for expositional simplicity that consumers are homogeneous
and therefore t = 0. Obviously, the homogeneity of consumers allows the
ISP to extract all consumer surplus in equilibrium by setting
a∗ = h+ vθ¯ − c(I)wˆ. (15)
As a convention, since we will assume h > 0, in this case all consumers
connect to the ISP, such that
α¯∗ = 1. (16)
Notice, that the ISP’s revenue from consumer access will not directly depend
on the network regime because of (13). However, wˆ depends on the network
capacity, µ, which is under the ISP’s control, at least in the long-run. Fur-
thermore, content variety, θ¯, has a direct influence, as well as an indirect
influence via wˆ = 1
µ−θ¯λ on the optimal access charge. Thus, under a network
neutral regime, the ISP’s challenge is to set the optimal capacity µ, which
will determine the congestion level and consequently content variety. Under
a discriminatory regime, the ISP must additionally select a strategic price,
p, at which he sells priority access to content providers.
4 Short-Run Effects of Network Discrimina-
tion
4.1 The Benchmark: Network Neutrality
Under network neutrality the platform offers only one transmission service
class and no content provider’s traffic is prioritized. As mentioned above, con-
tent providers are heterogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to network
congestion, but all of them rely on advertising revenue. Service providers are
arranged on the unit interval in order of ascending congestion sensitivity, θ.
Those, providers with θ close to zero offer a service with waiting time insen-
sitive advertisement revenues, whereas those with values of θ close to one are
very sensitive to network congestion. Since it will always be optimal for the
ISP to set the access price according to (15), all consumers will subscribe
and α¯ = 1. Therefore, given the mass of active content providers and the
ISP’s transmission capacity,
wN =
1
µ− θ¯Nλ. (17)
Given this congestion level, content providers will enter the market until their
sensitivity to congestion is so severe that their business model is not sustain-
able anymore. Formally, the mass of active content providers in equilibrium
12
is derived by equating (6) with zero (the value of the outside option) while
substituting (9) and (16) to yield: 16
θ¯N
∗
=
µ
λ+ I
(18)
Notice that an increase in network traffic per content provider, λ, has an
adverse effect on network congestion and content variety:
∂wN
∂λ
> 0 and
∂θ¯N
∂λ
< 0
We denote this as the niveau effect. Furthermore, recall that under a network
neutral regime, the ISP makes only profits by selling access to consumers.
By substituting (9) and (18) into (15), one obtains the optimal access charge
and thus, by (3), the short-run ISP profit:
aN
∗
s = Π
N∗
s = h+
vµ
λ+ I
− c (λ+ I)
µI
(19)
Intuitively, it can be seen that the ISP’s short-run profit increases with
network capacity, µ.
4.2 Network Discrimination
In a discriminatory network the ISP can alleviate congestion for those content
providers who have bought a priority access to users. According to (12), in
the short-run, when transmission capacity is fixed, the remaining providers
will be served at degraded best-effort access compared to the network neutral
regime. We may now distinguish three types of content providers:
1. CPs whose business model is relatively insensitive to network conges-
tion: They will remain in the free-of-charge best-effort class.
2. CPs whose business model is sufficiently sensitive to network conges-
tion: They will opt for priority access at a price of p.
3. CPs whose business model is extremely sensitive to network congestion:
They will be foreclosed from market entry and remain inactive.
The content provider indifferent between the first two cases is denoted
by θ˜D, whereas the content provider indifferent between the last two cases is
denoted by θ¯D. Obviously, it must hold that 0 < θ˜D < θ¯D.
16We restrict our analysis to the interesting case where (at least) the most congestion
sensitive content provider, located at θ = 1, remains inactive in equilibrium. This is
ensured if consumers are sufficiently impatient, i.e iff I > µ− λ > 0.
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Contrary to Choi and Kim (2008), in our model the “high cost” service
providers are more likely to opt for the priority class. This has two reasons:
First, we do not model the competitive aspect of obtaining a larger market
share based on the prioritized connection. Second, in our model the incentive
to buy priority is based on the individual business model’s innate need for a
higher connection quality.
Formally, to determine θ˜D and θ¯D from (7), one must compute the fulfilled
expectations equilibrium by simultaneously considering the equations(
1− θ˜DwD2 I
)
rλ =
(
1− θ˜DwD1
)
rλ− pλ(
1− θ¯DwD1 I
)
rλ− pλ = 0
as well as (8), (10) and (11) to obtain
θ˜D
∗
=
pµI
λ(λ+ I)(r − p) =
pI
(r − p)λθ¯
D∗ (20)
θ¯D
∗
=
µ
λ+ I
. (21)
First, notice the intuitive result that θ˜D decreases as the individual traffic
volume, λ increases, or likewise, as the price for priority transmission service,
p, decreases, meaning that more content providers will chose priority access
in both circumstances. Furthermore, comparing equation (21) with (18)
directly reveals that
θ¯D
∗
= θ¯N
∗
, (22)
which immediately proofs the following result.
Proposition 1 In the short-run, network discrimination has no effect on in-
novation. The number of active content providers does not change compared
to network neutrality, independent of the price for priority access.
With reference to the network neutrality debate this result has important
implications, because under the present assumptions the claims of both par-
ties are flawed in the short-run: Network discrimination will neither lead to
more, nor to less innovation. What is even more surprising is the fact that
the precise nature of the price for priority access is irrelevant.
Next, we investigate the ISP’s incentives to engage in network discrimi-
nation. From equation (12) we know that consumers’ average waiting time
is not affected by network discrimination. Furthermore, equation (22) shows
that also consumers’ network utility has not changed compared to the net-
work neutral regime. Therefore, in the short-run, the ISP cannot extract
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extra rents from consumers and the optimal access charge is the same as
under net neutrality:
aD
∗
s = a
N∗
s (23)
However, in a discriminatory regime the ISP can additionally extract rents
from content providers through the sales of priority access. In the short-run,
he will do so by maximizing βθ¯pD, which is achieved through
pD
∗
= r
(
1−
√
I
λ+ I
)
. (24)
It is easy to see that 0 < pD
∗
< r for all positive values of λ, r and I.
Intuitively, this shows that through the sales of priority access, the ISP can
extract a fraction of each content provider’s gross advertisement revenue r.
Thus, the ISP will make an extra profit of
∆ΠDs ≡ λβθ¯D
∗
pD
∗
=
(
1− p
D∗
(r − pD∗)λ
)(
µ
λ+ I
)
pD
∗
> 0 (25)
compared to the network neutral regime.
Proposition 2 The ISP has a short-run incentive to introduce a network
discriminatory regime, because this allows him to collect extra profits from
selling priority access to content providers. However, consumers pay the
same price for network access than under the network neutral regime.
Proposition 2 highlights that ISPs will indeed engage in network discrim-
ination when capacity is fixed. This result is supported by numerous ob-
servations of recent ISP practices, which have in fact triggered the network
neutrality debate in the first place. Among the most prominent examples is
Comcast, one of the largest U.S. Internet service providers, who was reported
to have engaged in discriminatory actions in late 2007 (Businessweek, 2008).
However, it must be annotated, that Comcast did not receive any payments
from content providers, at least officially, in order to accelerate or slow down
certain types of traffic. Nevertheless, the incentives to do so are certainly
very real and soon money will be changing hands if network discrimination
is not prevented by regulatory bodies.
4.3 Welfare Analysis
In order to provide useful insights for the current policy debate, we conclude
the short-run analysis of network discrimination by investigating the welfare
effects. In the present context, total short-run welfare, Ws, is constituted by
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three different elements: (i) Internet consumers’ surplus, ICSs, (ii) content
providers’ surplus, CPSs, and (iii) the ISP’s profit, Πs:
Ws = ICSs + CPSs + Πs (26)
With respect to Internet consumers’ surplus, it has been shown that
ICSs = 0 in both regimes, because consumers are homogeneous and thus
the ISP can always extract their surplus fully. Regarding the ISP’s profit,
we established that ∆ΠDs > 0. Therefore, it remains to examine the effect of
discrimination on content providers’ surplus.
Figure 1: The Effect of Network Discrimination on Content Providers’ Sur-
plus
Consider Figure 1. First, notice that those content providers located at
θ ∈ [0, θ˜D) are evidently worse off under a discriminatory regime, because
for them network congestion has increased from wN to wD2 . Second, the
content providers’ welfare loss increases with congestion sensitivity on the
interval θ ∈ [0, θ˜D). The business model of the provider located at θ = 0
is not affected at all through congestion, while the provider at θ = θ˜D is
already suffering so much, that he is indifferent between staying in the best-
effort class and buying priority access. Third, by the converse argument,
notice that the welfare loss is decreasing for those content providers in the
priority class as θ ∈ [θ˜D, θ¯) increases. To see this, recall from Proposition 1
that the last content provider to enter the market, θ¯, is identical under both
regimes and receives a surplus of zero. For him, the benefit through reduced
congestion (compared to the network neutral regime) is just offset by the
price for priority access. Consequently, for all content providers with less
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congestion sensitivity, i.e. θ ∈ [θ˜D, θ¯), the price is higher than the benefit
of being in the priority class. Nevertheless, by definition of θ˜D, for these
providers the welfare loss is yet less severe in the first priority class than
in the best-effort class. In this line of argumentation, it is also obvious
that content provider θ˜D incurs the greatest welfare loss. In summary, we
can conclude that in the short-run all active content providers are worse off
under a discriminatory network regime.
Note that the charge for priority access is merely a welfare shift from
the content providers to the ISP, so that the sign of the net welfare effect,
∆Ws, will only depend on the difference between the gross gain through less
congestion of those content providers in the priority class and the gross loss
through increased congestion of those providers remaining in the best-effort
class.
∆Ws = ∆Π
D
s +
(
UDCP − UNCP
)
= βθ¯pD +
(∫ θ¯
θ=0
UDCP (θ) dθ −
∫ θ¯
θ=0
UNCP (θ) dθ
)
= λβθ¯pD︸ ︷︷ ︸
priority
charge
+λIr(wN − wD1 )
∫ θ¯
θ=θ˜
θ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion alleviation
to priority class
− λIr(wD2 − wN)
∫ θ˜
θ=0
θ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion aggravation
to best-effort class
−
∫ θ¯
θ=θ˜
λpD dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
priority
charge
=
λIr
2
[
(wN − wD1 )(θ¯2 − θ˜2)− (wD2 − wN)θ˜2
]
(27)
Equation (27) reveals nicely that the overall effect of network discrimi-
nation on welfare indeed depends on the relative size of the congestion ag-
gravation effect to providers in the best-effort class versus the congestion
alleviation effect to providers in the priority class. Obviously, the two effects
relate directly to the main argument of proponents and opponents of net
neutrality, respectively. This is exemplified in Figure 2.
Proposition 3 In the short-run, network discrimination unambiguously in-
creases welfare with respect to the network neutral regime, because congestion
is alleviated for the most congestion sensitive content providers in lieu of the
less congestion sensitive content providers. However, all content providers
are worse off under a discriminatory regime because the increased surplus is
expropriated by the ISP.
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Proof:
∆Ws > 0 ⇔ w
N − wD1
wD2 − wN
>
θ˜2
θ¯2 − θ˜2 ⇔
1− β
β
>
(1− β)2
1− (1− β)2 ⇔ 0 < β < 1 
Figure 2: Congestion Alleviation vs. Congestion Aggravation Effect of Net-
work Discrimination
Network discrimination will therefore generally be welfare improving in
the short-run, because it “allocates” congestion more efficiently. Those con-
tent providers who are relatively inelastic to congestion with respect to their
advertisement revenues are allocated more congestion than the providers with
relatively congestion elastic revenues.
5 Long-Run Effects and Infrastructure In-
vestment Incentives
In this section we extend our model to allow for long-run investments in
network transmission capacity. Much of the neutrality debate is rooted in
the ISPs’ concerns about infrastructure investments. On the one hand, ISPs
would like to accommodate for new innovative content because this is valued
by customers. But, on the other hand, they do not want to let the content
providers free-ride on their infrastructure investments. Therefore, network
discrimination seems to be a plausible way out of this dilemma.
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5.1 Transmission Capacity and Congestion
We now focus our analysis on the average service rate, µ, which is inter-
preted as a proxy for transmission capacity. An increase of µ allows the ISP
to handle more service requests to content providers simultaneously. Since all
available customers are always connected in equilibrium, capacity expansion
can only generate extra profits on the consumer side through the indirect
effects of increased service variety and reduced congestion. Both effects orig-
inate on the content provider side. In particular, we can distinguish three
effects:
• The expansion effect denotes that an increase of capacity reduces the
overall congestion level and thereby allows for the emergence of new
innovative content providers.
• The congestion effect, on the contrary, indicates the negative feedback
loop of the expansion effect on congestion. The entry of new content
providers generates higher network traffic, since customers visit all con-
tent providers equally, which in turn increases congestion.
• Likewise, recall that an increase in network traffic can also be achieved
via the niveau effect by which an increase of λ has adverse effects on
content variety and network congestion.
In either regime the overall direction of these effects depends crucially on
the ISP’s optimal choice of µ. Formally, we model the investment decision as
a discrete decision stage which precedes the previous analysis. Thus, the ISP
chooses first its transmission capacity, µ, and then, in a second stage, the
customer access charge, a, together with, the priority price p, if applicable.17
5.2 Network Neutrality
Recall from the short-run analysis that under a network neutral regime, the
network operator makes profits from selling consumer access only. He cap-
tures the full consumer surplus, but does not tap content providers’ surplus.
This does not change in the long-run. The ISP may therefore only increase
his revenue through the expansion effect and reaping consumers’ additional
externality for content variety. Given the optimal access charge from (15),
the choice of optimal infrastructure investment will be determined at the
point where the marginal revenue MRN from capacity expansion equals the
17Accordingly, the solution concept is that of subgame perfectness.
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marginal costs MC ≡ ∂k(µ)
∂µ
. The marginal revenue can be written as follows:
MRN =
v
(λ+ I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
variety
incentive
+
c(λ+ I)
µ2I︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion avoidance
incentive
(28)
Intuitively, the ISP chooses a higher transmission capacity if consumer’ op-
portunity costs in time, c, are high. We call this the congestion avoidance
incentive of infrastructure investment. Waiting costs directly reduce the pos-
sible access charge which the platform can extract from the users. The same
intuition holds for the value of variety, v. Therefore, we call this the variety
incentive. In fact, if v is very large, the ISP could have an excessive incentive
to invest into capacity.18
5.3 Network Discrimination
In a network discriminatory regime, the entry of additional content providers
not only increases the ISP’s revenues from access, but also revenues from pri-
ority sales. The necessary infrastructure upgrades caused by increased traffic
through the entry of additional content providers can therefore be easier
compensated. Given the equilibrium values of a and p from the short-run
analysis, the ISP decides about network investments based on the marginal
revenue of capacity expansion.
MRD =
v
(λ+ I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
variety
incentive
+
c(λ+ I)
µ2I︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion
avoidance
incentive
+
(
1− p
D∗
(r − pD)λ
)
pD
(λ+ I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
priority revenue incentive
(29)
It is immediately obvious that the ISP has an additional incentive to in-
crease capacity under network discrimination, which we thus call the pri-
ority revenue incentive. Compared to the neutral network regime, the ISP
will therefore invest more into infrastructure and provide higher transmission
capacity.
As illustrated in figure 3 capacity expansion allows new congestion sensi-
tive service providers to enter the market. This services could not profitable
operate under a neutral regime. Our results therefore suggest that discrimi-
nation is more likely to foster innovation at the edge instead of hindering it.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the ISP will also earn greater profits under a
discriminatory regime.
18This could happen with linear costs of capacity expansion. Under a convex cost
function, infinite capacity expansion can never be optimal.
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Figure 3: The Long-run Effect of Network Discrimination on Innovation.
Proposition 4 Under a discriminatory regime the ISP will invest more in
network infrastructure and provide higher transmission capacity in the long-
run. Thereby, ISP profit, consumer access charge and content variety are
higher than under a network neutral regime.
5.4 Welfare and Regulation
From the short-run welfare analysis, it is obvious that the general level of
network congestion is crucial in driving the welfare effects.
Proposition 5 Under the network discriminatory regime, the overall con-
gestion level is reduced compared to network neutrality. The already posi-
tive short-run welfare effects of network discrimination are therefore even
increased in the long-run.
Proof: It remains to verify that ∂w
∂µ
=
∂ 1
µ−λT
∂µ
< 0: First, see that λT =
θ¯λ = λµ
λ+I
, so that ∂λT
∂µ
= λ
λ+I
< 1. Therefore, it holds that ∂(µ−λT )
∂µ
> 0 and
consequently,
∂ 1
µ−λT
∂µ
< 0 
However, the fact remains that most of the welfare gain is appropriated
by the ISP. This is the downside of network discrimination. Once a dis-
criminatory network regime is established, the question will therefore arise if
price regulation could enable content providers to retain more of their sur-
plus. Assume a regulatory agency would lower the price for prioritized traffic
under the level which the monopolistic platform owner has chosen according
to (24). Certainly, this would result in more content providers subscribing
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to the priority service, which in turn increases the average waiting time for
consumers using priority services and even more for consumers using the
best-effort services. It is easy to verify that price regulation would indeed
shift some of the surplus back from the ISP to the content providers. Unfor-
tunately, when applying price regulation, the regulator also destroys welfare,
because the ISP’s revenues from priority access are in fact welfare neutral
transfers. In the most extreme case, price regulation could impose a price
of pR = 0, which would de facto reestablish the network neutral regime. By
Proposition 3 and 5 this cannot be welfare optimal. In fact, in the present
model a welfare maximizing regulator has the same incentives as the platform
owner. To see this consider (27) and derive the optimal price as well as the
optimal investment incentives of a regulator. Solving ∂∆W
∂p
= 0 for p reveals
that the welfare maximizing priority price is equal to the price choosen by
the platform owner: pR
∗
= pD
∗
. Solving ∂∆W
∂µ
shows the same result holds
for the optimal capacity.
Proposition 6 Under a discriminatory network regime a welfare maximiz-
ing regulator has the same investment incentives as the platform owner.
Therefore, price regulation under the desired level of the platform will in-
evitably lead to welfare reductions.
6 Conclusion
We contribute to the net neutrality debate with a formal framework that
incorporates Internet consumers, content providers and an Internet service
provider. Our model complements previous work in this strand of the liter-
ature by explicitly considering the adverse effects of traffic prioritization to
the remaining best-effort class in a two-sided market model. Thereby, our
focus is to study the effect of network discrimination on innovation of content
providers and the ISP’s incentives for transmission infrastructure investment.
Generally, we find that network discrimination has positive effects on
welfare, because congestion is better allocated among content providers with
different sensitivity to network congestion. Those content providers with
congestion inelastic advertisement revenues remain with the free best-effort
transmission service, in which they experience more congestion than under
network neutrality. Conversely, those content providers with relatively con-
gestion elastic ad revenues are alleviated from congestion and thereby gen-
erate overall welfare gains. In the long-run, network discrimination leads to
infrastructure investments in transmission capacity and encourages innova-
tion. In the short-run, however, innovation is not expected because the ISP
expropriates the increased content provider surplus through the price for the
priority transmission service. This is the downside of network discrimina-
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tion. Although total welfare is increased, content providers will–at least in
the short-run–be worse off than under network neutrality.
Although price regulation can shift some of the congestion alleviation
gains back to content providers, it is inapt as a policy instrument, because
welfare is proportionally destroyed in the process. Therefore, if regulatory
correction is desired, it should address the expansion of transmission capacity
directly, e.g. by subsidizing broadband roll-out.
To provide a benchmark for future research, we made the fundamental
assumption that content providers are not in competition with each other
and that they are equally visited by customers. We believe that our re-
sults are fairly robust to small variations of this assumption. For exam-
ple, one could incorporate competition by assuming that content providers’
revenue-per-click depends on the congestion level also. Furthermore, also the
consumers’ utility function could consider the improved performance of con-
gestion sensitive services due to prioritization. However, in both cases the
relative advantage of network discrimination would be merely amplified.
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